International Differences in the Business Practices and Productivity of Firms by Richard B. Freeman et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research
Volume Title:  International Differences in the Business Practices and Productivity of 
Firms 
Volume Author/Editor: Richard B. Freeman and Kathryn L. Shaw, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-26194-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/free07-1
Conference Date: January 2006
Publication Date: September 2009
Chapter Title:  Labor Practices and Outcomes across Countries: Analysis of a Single 
Multinational Firm     
Chapter Author:  Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, Joseph Blasi
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0445
Chapter pages in book: (p. 105 - 135)105
Consider a multinational ﬁ  rm producing similar goods and services in the 
same industry in many countries. How much do labor practices, employee 
attitudes, and worker behavior diﬀer among the establishments of the ﬁ  rm 
across countries? Do workers in diﬀerent countries respond similarly to 
policies? Are aggregate measures of labor practices across countries related 
to diﬀerences in worker behavior and outcomes, or do the speciﬁ  cs of the 
ﬁ  rm trump such measures of conditions?
This chapter examines these questions using data from a 2005 to 2006 
web-  based and paper survey of workers in a large multinational manufac-
turing ﬁ  rm in 272 establishments in nineteen countries. The ﬁ  rm convened 
employee meetings in each facility to induce employees to respond, which 
led to a sample of 29,353 respondents, with a response rate of greater than 
60 percent.1 This gives us one of the largest individual level data sets on labor 
practices, employee attitudes toward work, and self- reported workplace per-
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1. The web surveys were submitted directly to our website and not to company administra-
tion. To protect the conﬁ  dentiality of workers who ﬁ  lled out paper surveys, each worker placed 
his or her anonymous survey in a sealed envelope that went into a box controlled by a committee 
of three nonmanagement employees who were instructed to drive it to an express mail/ shipping 
facility immediately. These protections of conﬁ  dentiality set the stage for a high “comfort zone” 
for open responses to the questions. In addition, the surveys were translated into the language 
of each country so that it would be accessible to most of the workers ﬁ  lling out the surveys who 
were native speakers. The company’s policy is to rely on local management teams and workers 
with very selective and infrequent use of expatriates. To the extent there are immigrants in the 
company’s workforce, this will mute the estimates of country diﬀerences.106    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
formance across countries in a single ﬁ  rm since Geert Hofstede’s (1984, 
1991) study of IBM based on surveys in 1968 and 1972.2 Our study diﬀers 
from Hofstede’s classic work in three ways. Hofstede’s surveys focused on 
European and Middle Eastern countries; our sample contains many obser-
vations from the United States and from countries in Latin America and 
Asia as well as from Europe. Hoftstede’s 1968 study included many workers 
outside manufacturing and his 1972 sample excluded manufacturing; our 
data are for manufacturing. Finally, Hofstede looked at employee values 
and beliefs as they related to organizations and national culture or character, 
while our focus is on employment relations, the organization of work, and 
the economic behavior of workers in response to labor policies.
Our analysis shows:
1. Large cross-  country diﬀerences in work practices, worker attitudes, 
and employee performance, evinced by signiﬁ  cant country dummy variables 
for all variables.
2.  Qualitatively similar responses of workers to work policies and prac-
tices across countries, as evinced in positive slope terms in regressions link-
ing measures of worker performance to the quality of labor-  management 
relations and the presence of a “high performance” work system, although 
with diﬀering magnitudes.
3.  A strong relation between reported employee performance and quality 
of labor- management relations at the level of establishments. This relation is 
similar among establishments outside the United States as among establish-
ments within the United States.
4. Taking country as the unit of observation, countries where workers 
report better employee-  management relations and compensation above 
market levels have better employee performance. In contrast, measures of 
worker performance are negatively or insigniﬁ  cantly correlated with country 
level indices of labor practices from the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index and the Global Competitiveness Index.
4.1      The Data and Research Strategy
Columns (1) and (2) of table 4.1 give the sample size and number of 
establishments by country in our survey. The source notes to the table show 
the speciﬁ  c questions on which we focus, and the way in which we coded 
them for analysis. Because the ﬁ  rm is headquartered in the United States and 
expanded from the United States to other countries, the United States has 
the largest number of establishments (73 percent of the total) and workers 
(72 percent of the total). The company began expanding internationally in 
the 1960s through acquisitions and accelerated its international presence 
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in the 1980s and 1990s. The large number of U.S. establishments allows 
us to estimate with some precision the level and interrelation of variables 
in the United States and use this as a base for seeing how institutional and 
economic environments outside the United States inﬂ  uence operations but 
limits comparisons of operations among other countries. It dictates the 
structure of ensuing analysis in which we take the U.S. mode of operating 
as an “original type” and treat the practices in other countries as “varieties” 
that depart from the original type in response to diﬀering regulatory and 
economic environments. This mimics the way Wallace and Darwin examined 
how species developed from existing populations across geographic areas.3
The survey asked about employee opinions and attitudes on the organiza-
tion of work, labor-  management relations, supervision, employee involve-
ment, and compensation systems; expected turnover, behavior toward 
coworkers, the eﬀort of workers at their job, and the eﬀort of fellow employ-
ees, plus a module of unique questions regarding worker perception and 
responses to seeing fellow workers shirk, their willingness to take innovative 
action at their workplace, and their views of how their facility performs. 
In addition, the survey contained measures of demographic and job char-
acteristics. Most of the survey questions asked workers to rate how their 
establishment or they operate using a ﬁ  ve-  point Likert scale, with higher 
numbers reﬂ  ecting more positive assessments, though some questions are 
dichotomous.4
We have structured our analysis around the distinction between 
policies/ practices that in principle the ﬁ  rm’s management controls, which we 
take as exogenous to workers, and outcome or behavioral variables that re-
ﬂ  ect worker decisions, which will in part respond to these policies/ practices. 
One way to analyze a survey with many questions in particular domains 
is to focus on a subset of variables that reﬂ  ect responses to speciﬁ  c ques-
tions. An alternative mode of analysis is to form indices of variables by 
compressing the data through factor analyses or through summated rating 
or other indices. In this chapter, we choose the former procedure in most 
cases, analyzing single variables as measures of practice or behavior. Where 
research has found that certain practices ﬁ  t together in a group, such as in 
the form of “high performance workplaces,” however, we analyze an index 
of several variables. To make sure that our results do not depend on the 
speciﬁ  c variables we chose or the indices that we form, we also estimated 
models with variables from all of the questions in the relevant modules and 
note the results.
3. Alfred Russel Wallace (July 1858).
4. In addition to the worker survey, we obtained administrative records from the ﬁ  rm on 
the economic performance of seventy-  nine divisions, with each division containing facilities 
producing a similar product, or in some cases, geographic units that report performance to 
top management. Here we relied on data that the ﬁ  rm normally gathers from its facilities to 
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Our primary measures of management policies/  practices are employee-
  management relations, the work practices that contribute to high perfor-
mance work systems, and total compensation relative to the market. While 
employer-  employee relations reﬂ  ects the behavior of workers and manage-
ment, management usually sets the tenor of the relationship, to which work-
ers or unions respond, by choosing work practices or policies. Since research 
has found complementarities in the eﬀects of these practices (Ichniowski, 
Shaw, and Prennushi 1997), we formed an index of high performance work-
place based on six questions relating to worker reports on: employee involve-
ment teams, training; information sharing; employee selection; proﬁ  t or gain 
sharing; and job rotation, as described in the source to table 4.1. Finally, 
management decides on pay relative to the market. While in principle it can-
not obtain workers below market rates, it can pay above market rates, either 
to reduce turnover or give workers an incentive to work harder (Akerlof 
1982).
On the workers’ side, we focus on four measures of individual behavior 
or potential behavior: whether workers are likely to look for a new job in 
the next six months, their willingness to work hard for the company, their 
willingness to innovate, and an index of the worker’s willingness to intervene 
with a shirking coworker. We also analyze their view on how hard coworkers 
work, and of the overall eﬀectiveness of their facility. The likelihood of leav-
ing a workplace is a widely studied variable in analyses of job satisfaction. 
Our question on the workers’ willingness to try to develop innovative prod-
ucts and services is designed to get at the more creative dimension of work, 
which has arguably become more important over time in most workplaces.
The measure of workers’ willingness to intervene when they see fellow 
workers not working up to speed is the most innovative measure of this study. 
It is designed to cast light on modern team production and group incentive 
employment systems (Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2006) that must overcome free-
 riding and shirking to succeed. Since workers often have better information 
than management on what fellow workers are doing, worker responses to 
shirking are critical to the success or failure of these approaches to the orga-
nization of work. The antishirking measure comes from a question about the 
likelihood that a worker responds to seeing a fellow employee not working 
as hard or well as he or she should: talking directly to the employee, speak-
ing to a supervisor or manager, talking about it in a work group or team, or 
doing nothing. By asking about responses in four ways, we obtained a more 
ﬁ  nely graded measure than if we had asked about any single response. Free-
man, Kruse, and Blasi (2006) provide a detailed analysis of this variable for 
random samples of all U.S. workers in 2002 and 2006 based on the General 
Social Survey and for the aggregated sample of employees across fourteen 
companies in this data set. The key ﬁ  nding is that antishirking behavior is 
greater when workers are paid by group incentive systems and is correlated 
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of fellow workers. Building on these ﬁ  ndings, we seek to determine whether 
there are any country diﬀerences in this behavior.
4.2    Empirical  Strategy
We have undertaken a two-  step analysis of our data. First, we seek to 
identify diﬀerences in employment practices, employee attitudes, and worker 
and establishment performance that we can attribute to operating in diﬀerent 
countries. Without such diﬀerences, this study would come to a rapid con-
clusion. The statistical problem with identifying country eﬀects in our data 
is that the survey has only a few establishments per country outside the 
United States (the largest number of establishments in a non-  U.S. country 
is nine, while there is just one establishment in ﬁ  ve countries). This makes it 
diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate the eﬀects of country institutions on outcomes from 
the eﬀects of establishments per se. We address this problem by contrasting 
the variation in estimated country eﬀects across all non- U.S. establishments 
with the variation in the same variables across U.S. states. Since ﬁ  rms in the 
United States operate under essentially the same legal regulations and insti-
tutions, variation among states/ regions will be due to regional economic con-
ditions or historic labor practices in geographically contiguous areas rather 
than to diﬀerent national labor regulations. This variation is thus an indica-
tor of diﬀerences independent of national institutions. Assuming an additive 
model in which regional factors are orthogonal to national institutions, and 
in which regional diﬀerences are comparable in countries, the variation in 
variables in our country analysis would equal regional diﬀerences as in the 
United States plus diﬀerences due to diﬀerent national labor institutions. 
Accordingly, our research strategy is to estimate within-  U.S. state/  region; 
and then compare the variation in the U.S. regional eﬀects with the varia-
tion in country eﬀects. If country institutions matter, the variation across 
countries should exceed the variation in the same variable across U.S. states. 
Since regional eﬀects are likely to be larger in the United States than in 
other countries, both because of the lack of national wage bargaining and 
geographic reach of the country, by subtracting the variation in variables 
in U.S. states from the variation in variables across countries to measure 
what we might call the “region adjusted” country variation, we potentially 
underestimate variation due to country eﬀects.
We next want to see whether estimated country eﬀects in worker outcomes 
are related to estimated country eﬀects in labor practices and policies. The 
problem here is that the ﬁ  rm operates in only nineteen countries, and has 
only one establishment in ﬁ  ve of them, which makes obtaining statistically 
trustworthy results diﬃcult. We deal with this problem by contrasting all of 
the non-  U.S.-  based establishments with all of the U.S. establishments. In 
addition, we estimated the relation between country diﬀerences in labor out-
comes and measures of country labor practices from the Fraser Institute’s Labor Practices and Outcomes across Countries    1 1 1
“indices of economic freedom” and the World Economic Forum’s measures 
of competitiveness.
Second, we assess how management practices aﬀect worker behavior by 
regressing four measures of worker behavior on the measures of company 
policy and practice. The problem in this analysis is that both the independent 
and dependent variables are self-  reports from workers. It is possible that 
workers would report practices/ policies based on their idiosyncratic position 
or views rather than on the overall situation at the workplace. For instance, 
worker A at establishment E might report that the establishment has good 
work practices and that they are willing to work hard while worker B at the 
same establishment might report that the establishment has bad work prac-
tices and that they are unwilling to work hard. This pattern would produce 
a strong relation between work practices and willingness to work hard at the 
individual level that would not generalize to the workplace. We deal with 
this problem by calculating and analyzing establishment averages, as well as 
the responses of individual workers. Averaging responses across establish-
ments eliminates the danger that the happy (unhappy) worker reports only 
good (bad) things about the establishment even when other workers have 
diﬀerent perceptions.
4.3    Cross-  country  Patterns
Columns (3) through (5) of table 4.1 report the average level of our three 
indicators of workplace policy: how the worker grades the ﬁ  rm on the qual-
ity of labor management relations; the index of high performance workplace 
policies; and a measure of whether the ﬁ  rm pays compensation above that in 
the local market.5 The note to table 4.1 presents the exact questions used in 
each case. The means for the policy/ practice measures show sizable country 
diﬀerences. For example, workers in the Czech Republic and Taiwan give 
higher ratings to the quality of labor-  management relations than those in 
Italy or Australia (column [3]); workers in Canada report that their estab-
lishments have more policies associated with high performance workplaces 
than those in France (column [4]); workers in China report that their total 
compensation relative to the market is signiﬁ  cantly lower than workers in 
the United States (column [5]), and so on. The F-  statistics for diﬀerences 
in country means at the bottom of the table are sizable and highly signiﬁ  -
cant.
Columns (6) through (9) of the table give the means for the four measures 
of the performance of individuals at their workplace: the likelihood that they 
will stay at the job; their willingness to work hard; their willingness to oﬀer 
5. These are self- reported measures and not objective measures of company practices; how-
ever, these perceptions may be the key to worker behavior because they reﬂ  ect on important 
dimensions of the entire employment relationship.112    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
innovative thoughts; and their willingness to take action against a shirking 
fellow employee. Again, the table note gives the speciﬁ  c questions used to 
deﬁ  ne these outcome measures. These columns also show sizable diﬀerences 
in the country means and F-  statistics that indicate that the diﬀerences are 
statistically signiﬁ  cant.
Finally, columns (10) and (11) turn to how workers assess the activity of 
other employees and the eﬀectiveness of their facility, based on the questions 
given in the table note.6 We asked these questions to diﬀerentiate workers as 
observers of their workplace from their perceptions of their own behavior. 
To see if the reports on how other workers are doing diﬀer from the self-
  reports, we correlated the two variables. The measure of perceptions of the 
willingness to work hard of coworkers is correlated at only .122 with the 
measures of the worker’s own work eﬀort, so the two measures are indeed 
reﬂ  ecting diﬀerent perceptions. The mean values for the worker assessment 
of the work eﬀort of fellow employees and of the eﬀectiveness of their 
facility show substantial country diﬀerences. Employees in Brazil are more 
likely to report that fellow workers work hard than employees in Austra-
lia. Employees in Argentina are more likely to report that their establish-
ment operates eﬀectively than employees in Taiwan, and so on. Because the 
characteristics of workers diﬀer across establishments, however, it is pos-
sible that the diﬀerences among establishments by country in management 
policy/  practice variables and worker behavior are due to diﬀerences in the 
characteristics of workers and jobs rather than to diﬀerences in institutions 
across the countries of concern to us. To see whether observable worker 
and job characteristics explain the country diﬀerences, we estimated the 
following equation:
(1)  Y ijc  a  bXijc  Dc  uic,
where Y is a speciﬁ  ed practice or outcome variable; i refers to the worker; 
j to the establishment employing the worker, c to the country in which the 
establishment is located, and where Xijc are covariates for the individual, 
Dc is a vector of dummy variables for the country in which the establish-
ment is located, and uic is an error term. The coeﬃcients on Dc capture the 
country eﬀect relative to the deleted country, which is the United States. 
Because establishments are located in only a single country, the estimated 
country eﬀects are averages of establishment eﬀects for the establishments 
in the country. The survey gives us detailed information on employee char-
acteristics such as age, gender, marital status, family size, number of chil-
dren, education, ethnicity, and whether the employee has a disability or not. 
There is also detailed information on occupational and job characteristics 
6. Division performance data supplied by the company is strongly correlated with these 
worker reports of facility eﬀectiveness aggregated to the division level, indicating that these 
reports appear to measure an operational variable.Labor Practices and Outcomes across Countries    1 1 3
such as ﬁ  xed pay, tenure, supervisory status, managerial level, and whether 
the employee is hourly or salaried or is engaged in administrative support, 
production, professional/ technical, sales, or customer service work. We esti-
mated two functional forms for equation (1): ordered probits when the out-
comes have several values with a natural ordering (e.g., “not at all true, not 
very true, somewhat true, and very true”), and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions with the dependent variables measured from 1 to 5, reﬂ  ecting the 
ﬁ  ve- point scales used in the survey. The statistical results were similar. Here 
we use the OLS regressions for ease in comparing F-  statistics.
The ﬁ  rst column in table 4.2 presents the F- statistics for the country dum-
mies with the establishments from all countries in the data set. They are siz-
able and signiﬁ  cant.7 As noted, however, with the small number of establish-
Table 4.2   Statistical tests for country eﬀects compared to regional eﬀects in 
U.S. establishments
Variance of dummy 
coeﬃcients
F- stat  for 
country diﬀs.
F- stat  for 





    (1)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
Policies
    Grade on ee-  mgt relations 18.43 11.27 0.072 0.015 4.94
  High-  perf.  index 26.85 10.13 0.168 0.026 6.48
    Total comp relative to mkt. 20.27 10.78 0.053 0.014 3.78
Own performance
  Likely  to  stay 18.17 15.36 0.075 0.011 6.85
    Willing to work hard 23.56 8.93 0.111 0.008 13.91
  Willing  to  innovate 18.06 6.05 0.055 0.005 10.17
  Antishirking  index 12.50 10.34 0.687 0.081 8.51
Coworker/facility performance
  Coworkers  work  hard 18.47 6.22 0.292 0.041 7.04
  Facility  eﬀectiveness 11.65 10.90 0.051 0.011 4.45
All 79 outcomes
    Average F-  statistic (37 outcomes) 24.86 10.43 7.891 1.904 4.14
  Average  Chi-  sq.  statistic 
  (42  outcomes) 259.65 160.34 0.078 0.013 5.84
    Percent of outcomes with higher 
statistics for country dummies 
(79 outcomes) 83% 100%
No. of country/state dummies   19   19   19   19    
Notes: ee-  mgt.  employee-  management. Based on regressions that control for job and demographic 
characteristics.
7. In addition, we also estimated the ANOVA model for the thirteen countries for which we 
have more than a single establishment and obtained larger F-  statistics. The F-  statistics for the 
thirteen country sample are: 26.04, 38.00, 29.08, 20.42, 31.05, 24.30, 17.43, 26.08, and 14.30.114    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
ments outside the United States, the diﬀerences could reﬂ  ect diﬀerences in 
local management practices and employee behavior among establishments 
that are closer geographically within a country than those in a foreign coun-
try. To see whether the estimated country diﬀerences reﬂ  ect more than the 
regional variation in practices/ performance in a single country, we estimated 
the state/  region eﬀects in practices and outcomes in the United States. We 
formed nineteen state/ regional dummy variables for the United States (thus 
mimicking the number of countries in our country data set) and estimated 
the contribution of these dummies to the variation in U.S. outcomes using 
the analysis of variance (ANOVA) model of equation (1). The computations 
show signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences in the value of the variables among the U.S. 
regions. But the F-  statistics in column (2) of table 4.2 are markedly lower 
than F-  statistics for the country dummies in column (1), save for the mea-
sure of overall plant eﬀectiveness, where they barely diﬀer. These data thus 
imply that for all but overall plant eﬀectiveness the country dummies reﬂ  ect 
more than “normal” regional variation in labor practices and outcomes 
across establishments.
The remainder of table 4.2 examines another measure of the diﬀerence 
in estimated country or U.S. state/  region eﬀects on the variables: the 
unweighted variance of the estimated coeﬃcients on the country dummies. 
For comparison, we also calculated the unweighted variance of the esti-
mated coeﬃcients for the state/ region dummy variables in the United States. 
Columns (3) and (4) of table 4.2 show huge diﬀerences between these mea-
sures: the variance of the country dummy variables is from 3.8 to 13.9 times 
as great as the variance in state/ regional dummy variables within the United 
States. The greater variation in outcomes across the countries in which the 
multinational operates than across the states/ regions in the United States in 
which it operates suggests that some of the variation across countries is due 
to genuine country eﬀects rather than to regional eﬀects that occur within 
the same country.8
Finally, to make sure that our results are not dependent on the speciﬁ  c 
variables under investigation, we analyzed all of the survey questions relat-
ing to labor practices, attitudes, and performance. There are seventy-  nine 
such variables. The results of this analysis are reported under the heading 
“All 79 outcomes” at the bottom of table 4.2. For the variables that give a 
clear ordering of outcomes, we use F-  statistics to measure the country or 
regional contribution to overall variation. For variables without such an 
ordering, we use chi- square statistics. As a summary of these computations, 
the table gives the mean F-  statistic or chi-  squared statistic for the relevant 
variables and records the proportion of outcomes in which the variation 
8. We also ﬁ  nd, in results not reported here, that the variation among Continental European 
countries is similar to the variation among English-  speaking countries, suggesting that the 
variation reﬂ  ects real country eﬀects and not underlying diﬀerences due to broader regional 
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across countries exceeds the variation across states/  regions in the United 
States. The results show that taking all of the variables, the variation due 
to countries exceeds that due to U.S. regions, as it does for the variables on 
which we focus.
In short, our data show that labor practices, attitudes, and economic per-
formance vary across establishments by country by more than one would 
expect from either of two null hypotheses: that there are no country eﬀects 
or that country eﬀects are no larger than region eﬀects within the United 
States.
4.4      Worker Responses to Practices
We turn next to this question: do these policies have the same relationship 
to the behavior or performance of workers in diﬀerent countries? Taking 
practices as exogenous, we estimate the following equation that relates com-
pany practices/  policies to worker reports on their performance and on the 
behavior of fellow employees and establishment eﬀectiveness.
(2)  P ic  a  bXic  cY ic  uic,
where P is a measure of performance, i refers to the worker; c to the country 
in which the establishment is located,a is a constant, the Xic are covariates 
for the individual, and Y ic measures the policies/ practices described earlier—
labor management relations, high-  performance workplaces, compensation 
relative to market compensation. The error term uic in this speciﬁ  cation is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed. (The establishment 
regressions in the next section control for correlated errors within establish-
ments.)
We estimated equation (2) separately for workers in the fourteen coun-
tries in the data with more than a single establishment, so as to reduce the 
danger that the calculations reﬂ  ect establishment eﬀects rather than country 
eﬀects. Each regression contains all three of the independent variables: the 
measures of employee-  management relations, the high performance work 
index, and total compensation relative to the market, so that the results re-
ﬂ  ect the impact of each of these policies while accounting for the impact of 
the other policies. On the basis of studies that link good workplace policies 
and workplace outcomes in single- nation studies, we expect that employee-
  management relations and high performance work practices will be posi-
tively related (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Huselid 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi 1997; Cappelli and Neumark 2001). On the basis of analyses of 
gift exchange (Akerlof 1982), we expect that establishments with above-
  market compensation will also have better outcomes.
The regression coeﬃcients in table 4.3 show that the vast majority of 
outcomes are signiﬁ  cantly positively related to measures of labor relations 
and high performance workplace practices in all countries. For example, in Table 4.3   Regression coeﬃcients linking policies to performance measures










work hard  
Facility 
eﬀectiveness
Ee-  mgt rels. coeﬃcient
All countries 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
Australia 0.10 0.18 –0.01 0.36 0.99∗ 0.56∗∗∗
Brazil 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01 0.30∗∗∗ 0.08 0.33∗∗∗
Canada 0.30∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ –0.05 0.63∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
China 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.13 0.37∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
France –0.04 0.25∗∗ –0.15 –0.08 0.88∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
Germany 0.28∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.01 0.17 –0.04 0.34∗∗∗
Italy 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ –0.02 0.22 0.14 0.17∗∗∗
Korea 0.32∗∗∗ 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.61∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
Sweden 0.20∗∗∗ 0.10 –0.10 0.02 –0.06 0.27∗∗∗
United Kingdom 0.38∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.09 0.38∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
United States 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
Mexico 0.10∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
Hi-  perf. index coeﬃcient
All countries 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
Australia 0.32 0.24 –0.03 0.00 0.34 0.22∗
Brazil 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.14 0.05 0.06∗∗∗
Canada 0.03 0.17∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
China 0.02 0.07∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.09 –0.01
France 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.45 –0.06 0.03
Germany 0.00 0.13∗∗∗ 0.04 0.06 0.19∗ 0.05∗
Italy 0.10∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.03 0.07∗
Korea 0.06 0.06 0.14∗∗ 0.12 0.06 0.19∗∗∗
Sweden 0.21∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.13 0.30∗∗ 0.06∗
United Kingdom 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.34∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.07∗
United States 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
Mexico 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.08 0.10∗∗∗
Total comp relative to market
All countries 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ –0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03∗∗∗
Australia 0.05 0.17 –0.01 –0.01 –0.04 –0.15
Brazil 0.14∗∗∗ 0.05 –0.05 –0.06 –0.10 0.02
Canada 0.11∗∗ 0.01 –0.02 –0.33 –0.01 –0.06
China 0.12∗∗∗ 0.05 0.02 0.18 –0.14 –0.04
France 0.10 0.19∗ –0.09 0.09 –0.31 0.12
Germany 0.06 0.10 –0.02 0.04 –0.20 –0.01
Italy 0.18∗∗∗ –0.01 –0.14∗∗∗ –0.01 –0.02 –0.09∗∗
Korea 0.03 0.13 –0.12 0.53∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.04
Sweden 0.10 0.12 –0.06 0.40 –0.33∗ 0.07
United Kingdom 0.03 0.05 –0.09∗ 0.12 0.35∗∗ 0.00
United States 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03∗
Mexico   0.08∗∗∗   0.06∗∗   0.06∗∗∗   0.05   0.21∗∗∗   0.02
Notes: Regressions are done separately by country. Each regression contains the three dependent vari-
ables at left, plus basic job and demog. characteristics.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Labor Practices and Outcomes across Countries    1 1 7
almost every country, workers who report more positive management labor 
relations or whose establishments have high-  performance work practices 
are more likely to remain with the ﬁ  rm, more willing to work hard, more 
likely to take action against fellow workers who shirk, and more willing 
to make innovative suggestions. In addition, these workers are also more 
likely to report that their coworkers work hard, and that their establish-
ment operates eﬀectively. Of the seventy- two estimated coeﬃcients on labor 
relations in table 4.3, forty-  seven are signiﬁ  cantly positive. Of the seventy-
  two estimated coeﬃcients on our measure of high performance work prac-
tices, forty-  ﬁ  ve are signiﬁ  cantly positive. By contrast, just nineteen of the 
estimated coeﬃcients on the measure of total compensation relative to the 
market are signiﬁ  cantly positive. The implication is that labor practices are 
more important factors in the outcome variables than levels of pay. This is 
consistent with empirical research within countries that compensation sys-
tems do not constitute a “silver bullet” in employment relations (see Hene-
man, Fay, and Wang 2002).
It is important to note that many of these estimated relationships are 
economically signiﬁ  cant as well as statistically signiﬁ  cant. For example, the 
coeﬃcients for the full sample indicate that one- standard- deviation improve-
ments in employee-  management relations, high performance policies, and 
total compensation relative to market increase the likelihood of staying 
by 0.27, 0.10, and 0.10 standard deviations of that variable. The eﬀect of 
employee- management relations on facility performance is especially large, 
with a standard deviation increase in employee- management relations linked 
to a 0.45 standard deviation improvement in facility performance. Across 
the six outcomes the eﬀects of one- standard- deviation increases for the full 
sample range from 0.04 to 0.45 for employee- management relations, 0.09 to 
0.15 for high- performance policies, and – 0.01 to 0.10 for total compensation 
relative to market.
The estimated relationships show similar patterns of response to man-
agement policies or practices across countries in table 4.3 but the estimated 
coeﬃcients diﬀer in magnitude across countries. For example, employment-
  relations have a smaller impact on the workers’ expected turnover behavior 
in China than in Canada, and a smaller impact on their willingness to work 
hard in Korea than in Canada. In France the estimates show a slight negative 
relation between employment- management relations and expected turnover, 
willingness to innovate, and the antishirking index, in contrast to the posi-
tive estimated impacts in most other countries. But the estimates indicate 
that the French are willing to work much harder than Americans in a high 
performance work system, which suggests that even the highly regulated 
French labor market workers will respond to a coherent system of work-
place practices in a positive manner. To assess the extent of the diﬀerences in 
the slope coeﬃcients across countries, we computed statistics that compare 
the variation in slope coeﬃcients for each policy variable on each outcome 118    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
across the countries. For comparison, we estimated regressions of equation 
(2) for each U.S. state/ region with the standard demographic and job charac-
teristic control variables and with all three workplace policies as independent 
variables. Finally, following the logic we used to analyze country dummy 
variables, we contrasted the variation in slope coeﬃcients among countries 
to the analogous variation among states/  regions in the United States. If 
responses truly diﬀer by country, the cross-  country variation among the 
slope coeﬃcients will exceed the variation among slope coeﬃcients among 
U.S. states/  regions.
Table 4.4 summarizes the results of these computations. Column (1) gives 
the F-  statistics from the test of equality of slope coeﬃcients from a pooled 
regression with country dummy variables to allow for separate intercepts 
and with identical coeﬃcients imposed on covariates. The F- statistics reject 
the equality of the slope coeﬃcients. They show signiﬁ  cant cross-  country 
variation in the magnitudes of coeﬃcients estimated in table 4.3. Column 
(2) gives F-  statistics for the equality of slope coeﬃcients from the compa-
rable analysis for states/ regions in the United States. The F- statistics for the 
regions are smaller than those for the countries. Following the logic that we 
used earlier to test for the existence of country intercept eﬀects above and 
beyond those potentially due to regional variation within a country, we inter-
pret this pattern to mean that there are substantial cross- country diﬀerences 
in the relationship between workers’ responses and the relevant policies or 
practices. However, the diﬀerences in the estimated response parameters 
between the country regressions and the state regressions are smaller than 
the diﬀerences found in table 4.2 for the country dummy variables. This is 
shown most clearly in columns (3) and (4), which report the variances of 
the estimated slope coeﬃcients for the countries and U.S. states/  regions, 
respectively. The variances for the estimated coeﬃcients are 1.2 to 9.7 times 
larger among countries than among U.S. states/  region.
Finally, there are also diﬀerences in the consistency of the estimated rela-
tionship of policy variables to outcomes among the variables. There are 
relatively weak diﬀerences across the countries and across U.S. states/ regions 
on the impact of workplace policies on willingness to work hard, imply-
ing that the policies and practices have relatively similar relationships to 
this outcome measure. By contrast, there are relatively strong diﬀerences 
across countries in the likelihood of seeking a new job and in assessment 
of the eﬀectiveness of their facility. In addition, the grade on employee-
 management relations and total compensation relative to the market have a 
strong signiﬁ  cant impact on country diﬀerences in workers’ report of their 
coworkers’ willingness to work hard, while the presence of a high perfor-
mance work system does not. This pattern also exists in the U.S. states/ region 
but the diﬀerences are more pronounced across countries. The greatest varia-
tion across countries is in the relationship of high-  performance policies to 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.120    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
of policies on antishirking may be greatly aﬀected by country cultures and 
institutions.
In sum, we conclude that although the relationship between workers’ 
responses and the policies and practices are qualitatively the same across 
the countries, the greater diﬀerences in the variation of responses across 
countries than across states suggests that the magnitude of responses diﬀers 
across countries—that is, that slope as well as intercept terms have a country 
dimension.
4.5    Establishment  Level  Patterns
The analyses thus far have related workers’ reports of practices and poli-
cies at their workplace to their reports of actual or expected behavior or 
that of their coworkers. As pointed out, however, relations found among 
individuals need not generalize to the establishment, much less to countries. 
Just as there are problems in making inferences about individual behavior 
from correlations in regional or other aggregated data—the ecological cor-
relation problem9—there are problems in making inferences from individual 
level data about the responses to policies for groups. If workers at the same 
establishment report diﬀerently on establishment practices, we cannot read-
ily infer from regressions based on individuals how changes in establishment 
policies would impact the establishment.
One way to assess the importance of this problem is to examine the consis-
tency of workers’ reports on their establishment’s practices and performance 
within a given establishment. If workers in an establishment report consis-
tently on the quality of its labor-  management relations, this is more likely 
to reﬂ  ect establishment policy or practice than if worker reports vary greatly 
within the same establishment. To see whether the reports of workers within 
an establishment coalesce at the establishment level, we used an ANOVA 
analysis to determine the extent to which establishment contributed to the 
variation in individual responses to particular questions conditional on the 
covariates used in equation (1).
Table 4.5 gives the results of this analysis for the policy/  practice and 
performance variables on which we have focused. The table shows sizable 
F- statistics for establishments, implying that workers’ reports about practices 
and outcomes have a signiﬁ  cant establishment component. The implication 
is that the results from the analysis of the data for individuals are likely to 
generalize, at least in part, to the establishment level that are arguably more 
appropriate for judging how establishment level policies and practices may 
aﬀect outcomes than the correlations among individuals.10
9.  See  http:/ / en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Ecological_correlation.  Also,  see  http:/ / en.wikipedia
.org/ wiki/ Ecological_fallacy.
10. See Lubinski and Humphreys (1996).Labor Practices and Outcomes across Countries    1 2 1
If each establishment had a single set of practices that aﬀected all workers 
the same, this would be the best way to estimate the eﬀect of those policies 
or practices. But it is possible that some of the variation among individu-
als within an establishment reﬂ  ects genuine diﬀerences in practices within 
the establishment. Some workers may report bad employee-  management 
relations because their supervisor is horrible while others may report good 
employment- relations because their supervisor is good. If all of the within-
  establishment variation in reported practices were due to this, the correla-
tions at the individual level would be superior to the correlations at the 
establishment level. This suggests that analyses at the level of mean estab-
lishment practices and mean levels of performance are likely to provide an 
underestimate of the relationship of policies and practices to behavior and 
outcomes.
The analyses in table 4.6 of establishment averages show that the rela-
tion between policies and practices and outcomes holds up at this level of 
aggregation. The top panel of table 4.6 records the regression coeﬃcients 
and standard errors for the impact of our three policy or practice variables 
and, to allow for any diﬀerences between the United States and other coun-
tries, a dummy variable for the United States. Looking at the ﬁ  rst column, 
the results show the average grade on employee-  management relations in 
establishments is signiﬁ  cantly associated with the average score on all six 
outcomes measured at the establishment level. By contrast, only one of 
the coeﬃcients on high performance work systems and only one of the 
coeﬃcients on total compensation relative to the market are signiﬁ  cantly 
linked to the establishment level outcome variables.
Table 4.5   Statistical tests for establishment level eﬀects in labor practices/policies
      F-  stat. for establishment diﬀerences  
Policies
    Grade on ee-  mgt relations 8.52∗∗∗
  High-  perf.  index 10.15∗∗∗
    Total comp relative to mkt. 6.75∗∗∗
Own performance
  Likely  to  stay 7.70∗∗∗
    Willing to work hard 5.00∗∗∗
  Willing  to  innovate 3.73∗∗∗
  Antishirking  index 4.14∗∗∗
Coworker/facility performance
  Coworkers  work  hard 5.28∗∗∗
    Facility  eﬀectiveness   10.77∗∗∗  
Note: Based on regressions that control for job and demog. characteristics, with 245 establish-
ment dummy variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.122    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
Figures 4.1 through 4.3 illustrate the strong relation between the average 
grade on employee- management relations across facilities and worker reports 
on behavior and outcomes. Figure 4.1 shows the positive link between the 
employee relations grade on average perception of worker eﬀort at the work 
site. Figure 4.2 shows the average score on antishirking activity, while ﬁ  gure 
4.3 shows the average perception of facility eﬀectiveness. Diﬀerentiating 
establishments outside the United States from those within the United States 
shows no noticeable diﬀerence in the slopes of these relations.
Finally, we complemented the analysis of worker reports on their behavior 
and that of their workplace with analysis of company-  based data on the 
performance of its divisions. The company provided us with measures of on- 
time deliveries by division, accident rates, changes in unit later costs, in sales 
per worker, and in sales outstanding. Because divisions encompass several 
Table 4.6   Relation between establishment average policies and establishment average 
outcomes
   
Grade on 
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Division level regressions predicting company-  reported data




































Note: n  258 in establishment level regressions, and 79 in division level regressions. Each row represents 
separate regression, with dependent variable at left.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Fig. 4.1 Employee relations and coworker eﬀort
Fig. 4.2 Employee relations and antishirking activity124    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
establishments, we obtained usable data for just seventy-  nine divisions. We 
aggregated our measures of company policies and practices to the division 
level and estimated equations linking policies and practices at the division 
level to division level outcomes. The results of these calculations are shown 
in the bottom panel of table 4.6. The results give a weaker and somewhat 
diﬀerent picture of the eﬀect of policies/  practices on outcomes than in the 
establishment level analysis of worker-  reported outcomes. The grade on 
employee-  management relations is not signiﬁ  cantly related to any of the 
outcomes. The high-  performance index is associated with better outcomes 
for on-  time delivery and accident rate while total compensation relative to 
market is associated with better smaller increases in unit labor costs and 
days sales outstanding.
Overall, while the establishment level data and the division level data 
conﬁ  rm the positive link between management practices and policies, par-
ticularly the set of practices that create a high performance workplace, and 
behavior or outcomes, the eﬀects are noticeably weaker in the establishment 
level regressions in table 4.6 than in the individual level regressions in table 
4.3. Why is this? The most likely explanation for the weaker eﬀects of the 
high performance workplace measure at the more aggregated levels is that 
only part of establishments, much less divisions, in fact meet that criterion. 
This means that some of the eﬀect gets lost when we move from workers to 
Fig. 4.3 Employee relations and facility eﬀectivenessLabor Practices and Outcomes across Countries    1 2 5
more aggregate units. For example, in a 200 person establishment, the 100 
workers doing ﬁ  nal assembly of a complex mechanical device may work in 
a high performance work system but the other workers do not. Workers as 
a whole rate the facility eﬀectiveness high (the only outcome for which high 
performance workplaces obtained a signiﬁ  cant positive coeﬃcient in table 
4.6), but the workers not in the high performance work system are not espe-
cially motivated to stay with the company, work hard, innovate, or intervene 
with shirkers. This would produce weaker establishment level and division 
level correlations between high performance practices and those outcomes. 
From this perspective, the association between the greater use of high per-
formance policies with better division level performance on two outcome 
measures is surprising.
The weak relation between total compensation relative to the market and 
outcome variables in table 4.6, by contrast, is consistent with the story told at 
the individual worker level in table 4.3, where worker reports on total com-
pensation relative to the market were the most weakly related policy variable 
to measures of success. This underlines the conclusion from table 4.3 that 
compensation systems do not constitute a “silver bullet” in employment 
relations systems. Employee-  management relations are linked to outcomes 
at the facility level as well as the individual level, while the compensation 
and high performance work system scores are not linked to outcomes at the 
facility level, showing that the eﬀects of these high performance work sys-
tem policies will be weakened when they do not cover a broad group of 
employees in a facility.
4.6    Country  Level  Patterns
Finally, to see whether the relations between policies/  practices and out-
comes also hold for country aggregates, we examine the correlations between 
the estimated coeﬃcients on the country dummy variables for each of the 
policies/  practices under study and for each of the country level outcomes. 
The coeﬃcients on the dummy variables show whether a country is relatively 
high or low in a given practice or outcome compared to the omitted country, 
the United States. The correlation between the coeﬃcients thus gives the 
cross-  country relation between the relevant variables.
The correlations in the top panel of table 4.7 show moderately sized posi-
tive relations between each policy/  practice variable and the performance or 
outcome measures as aggregate country variables. The strongest correlation 
is between the country measures of employee- management relations and the 
country measure of facility eﬀectiveness. Better employee- management rela-
tions is moderately correlated with country measures of being likely to stay, 
and willingness to innovate and intervene with shirking coworkers. As with 
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formance work system index is not correlated with country- level outcomes, 
presumably for the same reason—high performance work systems are con-
centrated among certain groups of workers and ﬁ  rms. Total compensation 
relative to the market at the country level is highly correlated with country-
  level measures of willingness to innovate and moderately correlated with 
country-  level measures of antishirking. Overall, given the small number of 
establishments used to obtain the estimated country eﬀects, the results are 
reasonably consistent with the patterns found within countries.
4.7      Relationship to Competitiveness Indices and Cultural Indices
The middle of table 4.7 relates the country dummy measures of perfor-
mance or outcomes to aggregate measures of labor market institutions pro-
duced by the Fraser Institute as part of its Economic Freedom of the World 
Index and by the World Economic Forum as part of its report on global 
competitiveness. The Fraser Institute’s index gives countries with less labor 
market regulation of wages, dismissal, employment, and union extension of 
contracts to nonparticipating parties higher scores in economic freedom.11 
The Market Eﬃciency component of the Global Competitiveness Index 
(Lopez- Claros 2006), based on public data sources and a poll of 11,000 busi-
ness executives, gives higher scores to countries where executives responded 
that: wages are not determined by a centralized bargaining process, labor-
  employer relations are cooperative, hiring and ﬁ  ring of workers is ﬂ  exibly 
determined by employers, and pay is related to worker productivity.12
The correlations in the middle of table 4.7 between global country mea-
sures of labor market institutions and this study’s country- level measures of 
worker outcomes do not ﬁ  t the view that “economic freedom” and “global 
competitiveness” means more economic success. The Fraser Institute’s 
Labor Market Regulation score (for which higher values indicate less labor 
market regulation) is not signiﬁ  cantly correlated with any of our estimated 
country measures of outcomes, and the largest correlation is a negative rela-
tion between the low levels of regulations and perceived coworker eﬀort. The 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index does even worse. 
It is signiﬁ  cantly negatively correlated with the country measures of willing-
ness to work hard, willingness to innovate, and perceived coworker eﬀort 
and facility eﬀectiveness. Similarly, the measures of individual regulations 
11. “To earn high marks in the labor market regulation index (5B), a country must allow 
market forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of dismissal, avoid excessive 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts and refrain from the use of conscription” (Gwartney and Lawson 2006, 
12). Many of the measures of the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFWI) rely on the 
Global Competitiveness Index. See Gwartney and Lawson (2006, 181–  82).
12. The individual country data and the text of the questions asked in the poll can be found 
on pp. 485–  89 (Lopez-  Claros 2006, chapter 1.1).128    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
are generally negatively correlated with our outcome measures, which given 
the coding implies that less regulation produces worse outcomes. We do not 
interpret these results as indicating that less regulation indeed reduces work-
place performance, but rather as demonstrating that widely cited indicators 
of labor practices at the aggregate level are poor measures of what goes on 
at the workplaces of this multinational, and potentially other ﬁ  rms as well. 
Workplace relations and practices at the establishment level are related to 
outcomes as opposed to more indicators of country level practices or poli-
cies.
The bottom panel in table 4.7 examines the relation between our mea-
sures of outcomes across countries and a diﬀerent set of indices: the ﬁ  ve 
national measures of culture that Hofstede (1984) created from his analysis 
of the values of IBM employees in diﬀerent countries, and that have been 
replicated since (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, 23, 26). These measures of 
cultural diﬀerences among countries are diﬀerent from the Fraser Institute 
and the World Economic Forum measures because they are based on data on 
individual workers rather than judgments of how the labor economy oper-
ates. Describing the creation of these indices, Hofstede and Hofstede say, “At 
ﬁ  rst sight it might look surprising that employees of a multinational—a very 
speciﬁ  c kind of people—could serve for identifying diﬀerences in national 
value systems. From one country to another, however, they represented 
almost perfectly matched samples: they were similar in all respects except 
nationality, which made the eﬀect of nationality diﬀerences in their answers 
stand out unusually clearly.” (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, 23)
The Hofstede indicators of culture are designed to measure how national 
cultures address ﬁ  ve common problems as outlined in Cultures and Organi-
zations: Software of the Mind (2005).
1.  Social inequality including the relationship to authority. This is measured 
by the Power Distance Index, which is based on research on the emotional 
distance that separates subordinates from their bosses with high scores indi-
cating greater power distance.
2.  The relationship between the individual and the group. This is measured 
by the Individualism Index, indicating that the ties between individuals 
are loose as opposed to societies where people are integrated into strong 
cohesive in-  groups that protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty 
throughout their lifetimes. It is based on various work goal items with high 
scores indicating more individualism.
3.  Concepts of masculinity and femininity: the social and emotional impli-
cations of having been born a boy or a girl. This is measured by the Masculin-
ity Index, with higher scores indicating more masculinity. This was the sole 
dimension where men and women consistently scored diﬀerently, with men 
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women attaching greater importance to having a good working relationship 
with the manager and cooperation as work goals.13
4.  Ways of dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity. This is the Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index, which reﬂ  ects employees’ level of job stress, orientation 
toward company rules, and intent to stay with the company over the long-
  term. Higher scores indicate the degree to which members of a culture feel 
threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations.
5.  Whether the culture is long- term or short- term oriented. This is the Long-
  Term Orientation Index, which reﬂ  ects fostering virtues oriented toward 
future rewards such as perseverance and thrift versus a short-  term orienta-
tion of respect for tradition, saving “face,” and fulﬁ  lling social obligations. 
This dimension expresses a “dynamic orientation towards the future” in con-
trast to a “static orientation towards the past and the present.” Higher scores 
indicate an orientation toward future rewards and against tradition.14
The bottom of table 4.7 gives the correlations between these “Culture 
scores” and outcome variables. The majority of the correlations (twenty-
 four of thirty) are not statistically signiﬁ  cant, indicating again the consider-
able gap between country- level measures and outcomes at a particular ﬁ  rm. 
Still, there are some suggestive results. The degree of individualism in the 
country- level culture measure is signiﬁ  cantly negatively correlated with how 
hard coworkers work. Because Hofstede’s measure of individualism is based 
on work goals that reﬂ  ect a desire to not work for the collective, this may 
ﬁ  t with his culture score. The degree of masculinity in a national culture is 
positively associated with “Willingness to work hard” and “Willingness to 
innovate.” Because the masculinity measure is based on the importance of 
earnings, recognition, advancement, and challenge as work goals, this also 
makes sense, although the term “masculinity” seems dated as an indica-
tor of these attributes. The Hofstede measure of uncertainty avoidance in 
a national culture is also not associated with any country-  level economic 
13. The “Masculinity” label for this index is not the label that the authors of this article 
would choose, because it is strongly suggestive of a strong and enduring level of diﬀerences 
between the sexes on these bases rather than cultural diﬀerences in how these characteristics 
get distributed. What we have written here is a summary of Hofstede’s own description of the 
index. Obviously, the authors do not accept the notion that men mainly care about some aspects 
and women mainly care about other aspects of the workplace, or that these aspects deﬁ  ne men 
or women. It is open to question whether men and women would score this diﬀerently on these 
items if the studies were done today.
14. This section is adapted completely from Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) as noted following. 
For a description of the respective dimensions and survey items along with the raw scores for 
the countries, see: the Power Distance Index, pp. 41–  44 with country raw scores and rankings 
in table 2.1 on pp. 43–  44; the Individualism Index, pp. 75–  79 with country raw scores and 
rankings in table 3.1 on pp. 78– 79; the Masculinity Index, pp. 118– 121 with country raw scores 
and rankings in table 4.1 on pp. 120–  21; the Uncertainty-  Avoidance Index, pp. 166–  69 with 
country raw scores and rankings in table 5.1 on pp. 168– 69; the Long- term Orientation Index, 
pp. 210–  11 with country raw scores and rankings in table 6.1 on p. 211.130    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
outcomes, although all the outcomes are positive. Hofstede based this index 
on “The percentage of employees expressing their intent to stay with the 
company for a long-  term career” (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, 166). It is 
modestly positively correlated with our measure of “Likely to stay” with 
the ﬁ  rm. Finally, the cultural indictor that is most highly correlated with the 
outcome measures is Hofstede’s “long- term orientation.” This is negatively 
associated with the country-  level economic outcomes of willing to work 
hard, willing to innovate, and the antishirking index, which does not seem to 
ﬁ  t with what it is seeking to measure. Again, the lesson we draw is that work-
place practices and policies trump measures of national characteristics.
Finally, we examine the relationship of the competitiveness and cultural 
indices to the slopes found in table 4.3, addressing the question “Do policies 
have a diﬀerent eﬀect on outcomes in countries with diﬀerent labor market 
institutions or cultures?” One might think, for example, that workplace prac-
tices will have a smaller eﬀect in countries where it is more diﬃcult to hire 
and ﬁ  re workers, since workers will be hard to motivate when it is diﬃcult 
to ﬁ  re them. The results in table 4.8 focus on slope coeﬃcients that diﬀered 
signiﬁ  cantly among countries (table 4.4, column [1]). There are few correla-
tions that are signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero, and the patterns do not tell a 
simple story, with most indices having mixed correlation signs across the six 
outcomes. One set of exceptions in the top third of the table are the Fraser 
economic freedom index, the wage ﬂ  exibility index, the hiring and ﬁ  ring 
index, the pay and productivity index, and the “masculinity” score: as each 
of these increases, it is more likely that employee-  management relations 
makes a diﬀerence in the outcomes. The remaining exceptions regard total 
compensation relative to market, which has a stronger eﬀect on outcomes in 
cultures with greater “power distance” and “long-  term orientation.”
4.8    Conclusion
This study has found country diﬀerences in the labor practices, attitudes 
toward work, and the economic performance of workers and establishments 
in a data set that covers 29,353 workers in a single multinational ﬁ  rm. The 
data set has a rich variety of measures, including an innovative measure of 
responses to coworker shirking with results from nineteen countries. The 
employment relations, worker attitudes, and performance of workers var-
ied more across countries than among states/  regions in the United States 
and were linked in ways that suggested that workers across these countries 
respond to policies in broadly similar ways. Analysis of establishment aver-
ages showed that the strong relation between good labor management rela-
tions and employee behavior or outcomes holds at the establishment level 
as well, while the relationship of high performance workplaces and above 
market compensation to employee behavior generally fails to generalize to 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Labor Practices and Outcomes across Countries    1 3 3
similar correlation of measures of policies/  practices and performance. The 
ﬁ  ndings of worker and establishment level diﬀerences are striking since the 
company strives to implement its employment system globally through many 
frequent international meetings of managers and employees. By contrast, 
aggregate measures of labor market institutions common to global “eco-
nomic freedom” and “competitiveness” scores across countries are either 
insigniﬁ  cantly or negatively correlated with our measures of performance, 
indicating that these variables fail to capture the reality of labor market 
operations on the ground in this ﬁ  rm.
The individual, establishment, and country comparisons support the idea 
that what matters are policies and practices at workplaces. Worker views of 
employee-  management relations had, in particular, a strong relation not 
only to standard performance measures such as likely turnover and will-
ingness to work hard, but also to our innovative measure of how workers 
would respond to a shirking coworker. The results on high performance 
practices and compensation, however, were more mixed. While we found 
strong evidence of country diﬀerences in behavior and outcome within the 
same ﬁ  rm, these diﬀerences were not well- related (or were inversely related) 
to national indicators of labor conditions and, in some cases, culture. To 




Grade on Employee- Management Relations. 0– 4 scale. “If you were to rate 
how well this company takes care of workers on a scale similar to school 
grades, what grade would you give in these areas? (C is an average grade.) 
Overall relations with employees.” (A, B, C, D, F). (4 = A, 0 = F).
High Performance Work System Index. 0– 6 scale. Composed of one point 
for each of the following components. Employee Involvement Team: “Some 
companies have organized workplace decision-  making in ways to get more 
employee input and involvement. Are you personally involved in any team, 
committee or task force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost 
cutting, productivity, health and safety, or other workplace issues?” (0  
no, 1  yes), 1 point. Training: “In the last 12 months have you received any 
formal training from your current employer, such as in classes or seminars 
sponsored by the employer?” (0  no, 1  yes), 1 point. Information Shar-
ing: “If you were to rate how well this company takes care of workers on a 
scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? (C 
is an average grade.) Sharing information with employees.” (A, B, C, D, F), 134    Richard B. Freeman, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi
1 point for A; .75 for B; .5 for C; .25 for D; and 0 for F. Employee Selection: 
“On a scale of 1 to 7 please evaluate how eﬀective your work area or team 
functions in the following areas: Selecting the very best people to be part 
of our team/  area.” (1  very ineﬀective; 4  neutral; 7  very eﬀective), 1 
point for a score of 7; .83 points for a score of 6; .66 points for a score of 5; 
.5 points for a score of 4; .33 points for a score of 3; .17 points for a score 
of 2; 0 points for a score of 1. Proﬁ  t or Gain Sharing: “In your job are you 
eligible for any type of performance-  based pay such as individual or group 
bonuses or any type of proﬁ  t sharing?” (0  no, 1  yes), 1 point. Job Rota-
tion: “How frequently do you participate in a job rotation or cross-  training 
program where you work or are trained on a job with diﬀerent duties than 
your regular job?” (1  never; 2  occasionally; 3  frequently); 1 point for 
“frequently;” .5 points for “occasionally;” 0 points for “never.”
Total compensation relative to the market. 1– 5 scale. “Do you believe your 
total compensation is higher or lower than those of employees with similar 
experience and job descriptions in other companies in your region?” (1  
lower; 2, 3, 4, 5  higher).
Own Performance
Unlikely to Look for New Job. 1–  4 scale. “How likely is it that you will 
decide to look hard for a job with another organization within the next 
twelve months?” (1  already looking; 2  very likely; 3  somewhat likely; 
4  not at all likely).
Willing to Work Hard. 1– 5 scale. “To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with this statement? ‘I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to 
help the company I work for succeed.’” (1  strongly disagree; 2  disagree; 
3  neither agree nor disagree; 4  agree; 5  strongly agree).
Willing to Innovate. 1–  4 scale. “I would be willing to be more involved in 
eﬀorts to develop innovative products and services.” (1  Not at all; 2  
very little; 3  to some extent; 4  to a great extent).
Antishirking Index. 4–  16 scale. “If you were to see a fellow employee not 
working as hard or well as he or she should, how likely would you be to: 
a) Talk directly to the employee, b) Speak to your supervisor or manager, 
c) Talk about it in a work group or team, d) Do nothing.” (Answers on all 
four parts of this question were coded on a 1– 4 scale for a summated rating 
with 1  not at all likely; 2  not very likely; 3  somewhat likely; 4  very 
likely. The last item was reverse-coded).
Evaluation of Coworkers and Facility Performance
Coworkers Work Hard. 0–  10 scale. “At your workplace, how hard would 
you say that people work?” Please rate on a scale of 0 to 10. (0  not at all 
hard; 10  very hard).
Facility Eﬀectiveness. 0– 4 scale. “If you were to rate the facility you work 
in on a scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these Labor Practices and Outcomes across Countries    1 3 5
areas? Getting the job done that has to get done eﬃciently. (C is an average 
grade.)” (4  A; 3  B; 2  C; 1  D; 0 = F).
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